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1 Introduction
Modern economic growth theory emphasizes technological progress as the engine of growth. In this
paper, we study how a country’s patent-issuing policy can aﬀect innovation and economic growth.
When there are competing claimants to the same innovation, the patent goes to the one who
filed a patent application first. While this simple first-to-file rule is the norm everywhere in the
world today, it was not so in the United States before the enactment of the 2012 America-Invents
Act. Earlier, the U.S. had instead adhered to an alternative first-to-invent rule, by which it granted
the patent to the one who claimed to have discovered the innovation first. Previous attempts to
switch to a first-to-file rule had been met with strong opposition. Opponents had argued that a
switchover would prove detrimental to America’s inventiveness, adducing the fact that the U.S. had
led the world in invention for more than a century thanks to the first-to-invent feature of its patent
law in eﬀect since 1836. This argument, if valid, implies that the world economy is in the “wrong”
patent regime. The objective of this paper is to investigate which of the two rules generates faster
economic growth.
The question of which rule is more conducive to innovation was first investigated by Scotchmer
and Green (1990) in a non-growth context. They considered a two-stage R&D race between two
firms, in which firms must discover the intermediate and the final innovation successively to bring a
new product to market. They argued that a firm is more likely to patent the intermediate innovation
under a first-to-file rule lest it be claimed by the rival who discovers it later. A patent puts the
intermediate innovation in the public domain and makes the second-stage competition a two-firm
race. Since two firms can make a discovery faster than one, it was concluded that first-to-file is more
conducive to innovation than first-to-invent.
The Scotchmer-Green result, however, proves to be sensitive to the key assumptions of the model.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (2015) found that their result can be reversed when innovation probabilities
depend on firms’ R&D eﬀorts. In a diﬀerent setting, Miyagiwa (2015) showed that a reversal can
also occur when a firm remains ignorant of a rival’s discovery unless it is patented.
All these works focused on innovation of a single product in partial-equilibrium settings. Al-
though the approach generates interesting insights, it is not certain whether partial-equilibrium
analyses can correctly predict the eﬀects on economic growth, an inherently aggregate phenomenon.
Furthermore, opponents in the U.S. seem to have been more concerned with the long-run eﬀect of
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adopting a first-to-file rule. The objective of this paper is thus to examine the eﬀect of patent-issuing
rules on economic growth in a general equilibrium model.
To model economic growth, we draw on Romer (1990) and consider an economy with three
sectors. The R&D sector invents blueprints for intermediate goods. The intermediate-goods sector
buys the blueprints to produce specialized intermediate goods under monopolistic competition. The
final good sector turns all the existing intermediate goods into a single consumption good. Labor,
the only factor of production, is employed in the R&D sector and the intermediate goods sector.
The economy grows as new varieties of intermediate goods are created. The steady-state growth
rates are computed and compared under the first-to-file and the first-to-invent rule.
Although the basic setup is standard, our analysis has two novel features. The first and foremost
is in the R&D sector. Here, we remain as close as possible to the Scotchmer-Green setup. Namely,
we assume the following.
1. Two firms engage in two-stage R&D for the invention of each intermediate good.
2. R&D is sequential; to invent a blueprint for each intermediate good, firms must discover the
first-stage innovation before proceeding to the second stage of R&D.
3. Innovation probabilities are exogenous.
4. The first-stage innovation and the second-stage innovation are independently patentable.
5. Information is complete, i.e. when a firm has discovered the first-stage innovation, the rival
knows it, but does not learn its content unless it is patented.
These assumptions ensure that the Scotchmer-Green result is not reversed by other factors noted in
the precursory studies, and allow us to zero in on the general-equilibrium growth-theoretic aspects
of the patent-issuing rules.
The second novel feature of our model is the introduction of asymmetry in the invention of
intermediate goods across industries. While asymmetry can be introduced in a number of ways,
we focus on the R&D cost asymmetry. In such a setting, the two patent-issuing rules aﬀect each
industry’s incentive to patent the first-stage innovations diﬀerently, generating a diﬀerential impact
on resource allocation and economic growth.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first extend the Scotchmer-Green model to a continuum
of industries with asymmetric R&D costs. It is still a partial-equilibrium model because the profits
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and wages are taken as given. In this “basic” model, first-to-file induces faster growth in product
development than first-to-invent. This is the growth-theoretic version of the Scotchmer-Green result.
The second step of our analysis extends the basic model to a general-equilibrium framework,
where intertemporal utility maximization and intersectoral labor mobility jointly determine con-
sumer expenditure and profits (the prize for innovation) in terms of the wage, the numeraire.
In contrast to the partial equilibrium model, the general equilibrium model gives rise to several
possible cases to analyze. To select a most plausible and data-consistent equilibrium, we restrict
our attention to cases in which a more patient economy grows faster. This criterion is intuitive,
empirically supported (e.g., Dohmen (2016) and Hübner, M. and G. Vannoorenberghe (2015)), and
widely observed in the standard endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer (1990) and Lucas (1998)).
Under this equilibrium-selection criterion, our analysis shows that first-to-invent promotes faster
economic growth than first-to-file, reversing the partial-equilibrium result. The reversal occurs for
the following reason. First, in general equilibrium, profits are lower in first-to-invent than in first-
to-file. Second, lower profits make patenting more attractive, inducing more industries to patent
innovations. Third, patents disclose information and lead to faster economic growth. The analysis
below explains these linkages in detail.
We now discuss this paper’s main contributions in light of relevant literature. They are twofold.
One is to the line of research in the industrial-organization literature. The works cited earlier examine
which patent system is more conducive to innovation of a single product, but leave unanswered the
question of which patent system promotes faster economic growth in an aggregate economy. Thus,
this paper is a natural extension of the precursory studies of innovation to a multi-industry model.
Our second contribution is to the literature on economic growth theory. Romer (1990) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) pioneered in developing the growth models based on expanding product
variety and rising product quality, respectively. Grossman and Helpman (1991) applied these two
approaches to international trade models. These seminal works have spawned much research on
the linkages among growth, innovation, and trade. Importantly, the above models have oﬀered a
tractable framework in which the eﬀect of patent policy can be examined. For example, the eﬀects
of a stronger patent protection can be studied, and optimal patent length can be characterized
(e.g., Grossman and Lai (2004)). However, this body of literature assumes one-stage R&D, that is,
a patent is immediately granted once a single innovation occurs. Thus, the mechanisms through
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which firms’ strategic patenting aﬀects long-run growth remains unexplored.1 Our paper fills this
lacuna. We believe this to be a particularly important contribution of the present paper because
patents are widely considered a key policy tool to promote long-run economic growth.
Turning to empirical studies on the issue of first-to-file versus first-to-invent, there is only a scanty
literature. Lo and Sutthiphisal (2009) used Canada’s 1989 decision to switch from first-to-invent
to first-to-file as a natural experiment and found that the switchover failed to stimulate Canadian
R&D eﬀorts. Abrams and Wagner (2012), also using Canadian data, discovered significant drops in
patent applications from individual and small-scale corporate inventors. These results are consistent
with our key result that first-to-file is less conducive to technical progress relative to first-to-invent.
The remainder of the paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 describes the R&D sector,
which is the core of the model. The section finds what induces firms to patent innovations in first-
to-file and first-to-invent. Section 3 compares the growth rates under the two patent regimes in a
partial equilibrium setting where the prize for innovation is exogenously given. Section 4 extends
the analysis of section 3 to general equilibrium. It is demonstrated that the Scotchmer-Green result
is reversed once the prize of innovation is endogenously determined. Section 5 concludes.
2 The R&D Sector
We begin with the R&D sector, which is the most salient component of our model. The production
sectors and the growth mechanism will be taken up in the next section.
Assume a unit mass of intermediate-goods industries indexed by j 2 [0, 1]. Industry j produces
nj(t) varieties of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods at time t. R&D is conducted in all industries
with the same key characteristics as in the Scotchmer-Green model. First, a blueprint for each
intermediate good is developed through two-stage R&D competition between two rival R&D firms.
The first-stage innovation is labeled by A and the second-stage innovation by B. Second, R&D is
sequential. To create a complete blueprint for a new variety, firms must first discover A and then
B. Third, R&D is stochastic; A is discovered with hazard rate ↵ and B with hazard rate  . These
hazard rates are exogenous and common in all industries.2 Fourth, both innovations, A and B, are
separately patentable. Fifth, patents do not expire, as in Romer (1990).3 As commented in the
1A closest study to ours is Cozzi and Galli (2014) who develop a two-stage R&D model, interpreting each stage
as basic and applied research. Crucially, however, they do not consider strategic interactions between firms as they
assume “many” firms through free entry.
2Scotchmer and Green (1990) assume identical hazard rates for two innovations.
3This is also implicit in Scotchmer and Green (1990).
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Introduction, these assumptions ensure that no other factors but the general equilibrium eﬀect can
reverse the Scotchmer-Green result. Finally, we assume that discoveries of A and B in industry j
require flow R&D costs cA(j) and cB(j), respectively, in terms of labor units and that these R&D
cost diﬀer across industries. This last assumption is the key to our analysis, as asymmetric R&D
costs induce industries to respond diﬀerently to patent law changes and impact allocation of labor
between the R&D and the production sector.
Let ⇧ denote the total “prize” of two-stage R&D competition, i.e., the discounted sum of all
future flow profits arising from the production of a new variety. ⇧ is an exogenous parameter in
the basic model of Section 3, but will be endogenized in the general equilibrium model of Section
4. Given separate patentability, it is possible that A and B are owned by diﬀerent R&D firms. In
such cases, it is assumed that the owner of A receives the share   of ⇧ while the remaining share
1     goes to the owner of B. We treat   2 (0, 1) as a parameter common to all blueprints in all
industries.4
The “leader” is the firm that discovers A first; the other firm is the “follower.” The main focus of
our analysis is on whether or not the leader patents A. In either patent system, the leader secures
the profit  ⇧ by patenting A. By contrast, the consequence of not patenting A depends on the
patent system in eﬀect. In first-to-file, the leader runs the risk of losing the exclusive right to A if
the follower discovers and patent A later. In first-to-invent, this risk is minimal because the leader
can always establish priority of invention. This diﬀerence gives rise to diﬀerent incentives to patent
A under the two patent-issuing rules.
2.1 First-to-File
We begin with the first-to-file rule. Fix an industry j 2 [0, 1]. Suppose that at time t one firm
(the leader) discovers A. Figure 1 shows the strategic moves and timing of the subgame played out
following the discovery of A. At node DL the leader chooses between P (= patenting A) and N
(= not patenting A). Let V PF (j) and V NF (j) denote the payoﬀ to the leader, respectively, when
she chooses P and when she chooses N (the subscript F indicates the first-to-file rule is under
consideration). If she chooses P , the follower skips stage 1 and play moves to node 1, where two
4Asymmetry can be introduced into our analysis by distinguishing and ranking industries in terms of the profit-
sharing parameter  j instead of the R&D costs. The results are similar, so this alternative approach is not pursued
here.
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firms compete in stage 2. Thus, V PF (j) satisfies the following asset-value equation:5
⇢V PF =  (⇧  V PF ) +  ( ⇧  V PF )  cB(j). (1)
The right-hand side has the following interpretation. The leader spends flow R&D cost cB(j) per
unit of time and wins the second-stage race with probability  , causing her asset value to change
from V PF to ⇧ as shown in the first term.6 At the same time, however, the leader could lose the
race with probability  , in which case her asset value changes as indicated by the second term.
Thus, the right-hand side of (1) represents the flow net benefit to the leader of patenting A at node
DL. In equilibrium, that benefit equals ⇢V PF , where ⇢ is the rate of interest.7 Collecting terms and
rearranging yields
V PF (j) =
  (1 +  )⇧  cB (j)
⇢+ 2 
.
Next, suppose that the leader chooses not to patent A at node DL. Then, play moves to node
2 in Figure 1, where an “asymmetric” R&D competition starts, with the leader in stage 2 and the
follower in stage 1. If the leader wins this race, the game is over. If instead the follower wins the
race, play moves down to node DF in Figure 1, where the follower has the option of patenting A.
We claim that the follower always patents A because there is no reason for secrecy when the leader
already has A.8
With the follower patenting A, a stage-two race starts at node 3. This stage-two race diﬀers
from the one at node 1 in that the leader does not hold the patent for A. Thus, the leader receives
(1    )⇧ if she wins, and nothing if she loses. By the procedure similar to the one that led to
equation (1), we can write the expected profit to the leader at node 3 as
V NPF (j) =
  (1   )⇧  cB (j)
⇢+ 2 
.
Now, returning to node DL, we can calculate the value of not patenting A, V NF (j), to the leader
as follows. By not patenting A, the leader initiates the asymmetric race described above at node
2. With probability   the leader wins the race, changing her asset value from V NF (j) to ⇧. On the
5A capital gain/loss term is suppressed to simplify exposition. It will be explicitly introduced in Section 4 where
the basic model is extended to a general equilibrium framework.
6More accurately, probability   , where   is an infinitesimally short time.
7In the general equilibrium model of Section 4, we use ⇢ to denote consumer’s rate of time preference. In fact, (1)
is equivalent to the steady state version of the asset equation in general equilibrium.
8It is readily shown that at node DF patenting A is the dominant strategy for the follower.
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other hand, with probability ↵, the leader loses the race, causing her asset value to change from
V NF (j) to V NPF (j). Thus, V NF (j) satisfies the following asset-value equation:
⇢V NF (j) =  
 
⇧  V NF (j)
 
+ ↵
 
V NPF (j)  V NF (j)
   cB (j) .
Collecting terms yields
V NF (j) =
 ⇧+ ↵V NPF (j)  cB (j)
⇢+ ↵+  
.
Now we state the leader’s decision rule at node DL; the leader chooses to patent A if and only
if V PF (j)   V NF (j). Substituting and simplifying, we restate this condition in
Lemma 1. In first-to-file, the leader patents A if and only if
cB (j)  [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]⇧   0. (2)
We now make three assumptions concerning the condition in Lemma 1.
Assumption 1. cB(j) is diﬀerentiable on (0, 1) and c0B (j) > 0.9
Assumption 2. (1   )      (⇢+ 2↵) > 0.
Assumption 3. (i) cB (0) < [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]⇧, and (ii) cB (1) > [(1   )     ⇢]⇧.
Assumption 1 is without loss of generality and says that industries can be ordered in terms of
R&D costs for B. Diﬀerentiability simplifies the analysis. Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that A is
patented in some industries but not in others.10
Assumptions 1 - 3 imply the following:
Lemma 2. In first-to-file, there exists JF given by
cB (JF ) = [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]⇧ (TH0F )
such that the leader patents A only in industries j 2 [JF , 1]
Several comparative-static results follow immediately from Lemma 2.
9We do not make a similar assumption regarding cA (j). Therefore, the analysis that follows in this section does
not depend on how cA (j) changes in j.
10Assumption 3(ii) can be replaced with c (1) > [(1   )B     (⇢+ 2A)]⇧. But, as we will see, (ii) is required for
an interior equilibrium in first-to-invent.
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Lemma 3. The threshold industry JF increases in ⇧ and  , and decreases in ↵, ⇢ and  .
Intuitions for the lemma are given below:
1. An increase in the prize of innovation ⇧ discourages patenting (raises JF ). This comes from
Assumptions 1 and 2. Intuitively, not patenting A prolongs the second-stage R&D, raising
the R&D costs. Thus, the decision not to patent A is justified only if the innovation prize is
greater. This means that as the prize increases, the leader has less of an incentive to patent
A, raising JF . This result plays an important role in understanding why the Scotchmer-Green
result can be reversed in the general equilibrium model in Section 4.
2. An exogenous increase in hazard rate ↵ encourages patenting (lowers JF ). When ↵ is higher,
the follower is more likely to catch up, if the leader does not patent A. This makes patenting
more attractive to the leader.
3. An exogenous increase in hazard rate   discourages patenting (raises JF ). With a higher  ,
the leader is more likely to win an asymmetric race (at node 2 in Figure 1), which makes
non-patenting more attractive to the leader.
4. An increase in the interest rate ⇢ encourages patenting (lowers JF ). As explained earlier, not
patenting A prolongs stage 2, costing extra R&D expenditure for the leader. A higher interest
rate ⇢ raises the R&D cost even more, prompting patenting in more industries.
5. An increase in the share   of ⇧ leads to more patenting (lowers JF ). A higher   means a
lower (1   ). This reduces the expected payoﬀ to the leader from non-patenting, and makes
patenting more attractive.
2.2 First-to-Invent
We now turn to first-to-invent. The treatment of first-to-invent requires two modifications in Figure
1. First, the payoﬀ box at node 4 changes as indicated in the figure. Second, node 3 becomes
irrelevant because the follower cannot patent A.11
We begin, as before, with the leader’s patent decision at node DL. When the leader patents
A, the consequence is the same as in first-to-file, namely, the leader’s payoﬀ V PI (j) is identical to
11It is assumed that, when the follower files for a patent, the leader blocks it by establishing priority of invention
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V PF (j);
V PI (j) = V
P
F (j) .
(The subscript I denotes the first-to-invent rule.) If the leader chooses not to patentA, an asymmetric
race commences at node 2. The expected profit to the leader, V NI (j), satisfies
⇢V NI (j) =  
 
⇧  V NI (j)
 
+ ↵
 
V NPI (j)  V NI (j)
   cB (j) .
To interpret this equation, note that the leader wins this race with probability  , obtaining the
entire prize ⇧. The leader can lose the race with probability ↵, turning her asset value from V NI (j)
to V NPI (j). The latter denotes the value to the leader of the asymmetric race for B that commences
when the follower catches up. Collecting terms yields
V NI (j) =
 ⇧+ ↵V NPI (j)  cB (j)
⇢+ ↵+  
.
This is the value to the leader of not patenting A at node DL in first-to-invent. This expression is
identical to its counterpart in first-to-file, except that V NPI (j) replaces V NPF (j). Both these terms
represent the value to the leader of the second-stage race commenced when the follower discovers
A, but there is a crucial diﬀerence. In first-to-file, the follower owns the patent for A, while in
first-to-invent the leader owns it due to priority of invention. Thus, the stage-two race at node DF
in first-to-invent is identical to the one at node DL in first-to-file, that is,
V NPI (j) =
 (1 +  )⇧  cB (j)
⇢+ 2 
= V PF (j).
It is easy to show that V NPI (j) > V NPF (j), meaning that, given ⇧, the leader has a greater incentive
not to patent A in first-to-invent than in first-to-file.
We are now in a position to state the leader’s decision rule at node DL. The leader patents A if
and only if V PI (j)   V NPI (j). Substituting yields
Lemma 4. In first-to-invent, the leader patents innovation A if and only if
cB (j)  [  (1   )  ⇢ ]⇧   0. (3)
Assumptions 1 - 3 imply the following.
10
Lemma 5. In first-to-invent, there exists JI satisfying
cB (JI) = [(1   )     ⇢]⇧. (TH0I )
such that the leader patents A in j 2 [JI , 1].
Lemma 5 shows that an exogenous change in hazard rate ↵ has no eﬀect on the leader’s incentive
to patent A (i.e., JI is independent of the hazard ↵). In first-to-invent, the leader owns A, whether
she patents it or not. Therefore, the follower’s success rate ↵ cannot aﬀect the leader’s patent
decision. This contrasts with the first-to-file case. The other parameters ( , ⇧, ⇢ and  ) have
qualitatively identical eﬀects on the patent decision as in first-to-file and the intuitions are basically
the same as before. For later use, we note the following.
Lemma 6. Both in first-to-file and in first-to-invent, a fall in ⇧ encourages patenting, and increases
the proportion of patenting industries (i.e., lowers the threshold J).12
We call this result the prize eﬀect. In the general equilibrium model of section 4, we discuss how
⇧ links the R&D sector to the rest of the economy and how the prize eﬀect holds the key to the
intuitive understanding of the general equilibrium eﬀect of patent policy.
2.3 Three Eﬀects
The next result follows straightforwardly from Lemmas 1-6.
Proposition 1. Given ⇧, more industries patent A in first-to-file than in first-to-invent (i.e., JF <
JI).
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. The graphs (TH0F ) and (TH0I ) represent the functions
given by the left-hand side of (2) and (3), respectively. Both graphs are upward-sloping because
cB(J) is increasing by Assumption 1. By Lemmas 2 and 5, these functions take the value of 0 at the
threshold industries JF and JI . A comparison between (2) and (3) puts the graph of (TH0F ) above
that of (TH0I ) as in Figure 2. Proposition 1 follows immediately.
An intuition can be gained by identifying three eﬀects of (not) patenting. First, not patenting
A is risky in first-to-file because the follower can catch up and patent it. Hence, the leader is more
likely to patent A in first-to-file. We call it the risk-elimination eﬀect. This eﬀect is absent in
12The intuition is given following Lemma 3.
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first-to-invent. Second, patenting allows the follower to bypass stage 1. Since two firms can discover
B faster than one, the leader receives the prize (or her share of it) sooner when she patents A. We
call it the expedition eﬀect. This eﬀect is present in both patent systems. On the other hand, not
patenting A makes the follower invent A, giving the leader a head start in the stage-two race. We
call it the detour eﬀect.
It should now be clear that the risk-elimination eﬀect explains why the leader is more likely to
patent A in first-to-file than in first-to-invent, for a given ⇧. The expedition eﬀect, on the other
hand, explains why the two curves are upward sloping in Figure 2. If a flow R&D cost cB (j)
increases, the leader has a greater incentive to end stage 2 sooner. But stage 2 ends sooner if two
firms compete (this is the expedition eﬀect). Thus, the leader has a greater incentive to patent A in
industries with higher flow costs cB (j). This and Assumption 1 imply that the (TH0F ) and (TH0I )
are upward-sloping.
3 Partial Equilibrium
3.1 The Production Sectors
Having described the R&D sector and the strategic decisions of R&D firms, we turn to the production
sectors. As in Romer (1990), the economy has two production sectors. The intermediate-goods sector
consists of a continuum of industries j 2 [0, 1], and industry j uses labor to produce nj(t) varieties
of intermediate goods at time t. The final good sector turns out Y (t) units of the final good from
the whole gamut of existing intermediate goods according to the production function:
Y (t) =
 Z 1
0
Z nj(t)
0
xij(t)
✓didj
! 1
✓
(4)
where ✓ 2 (0, 1) is a parameter and xij(t) is the flow of output of an intermediate good produced by
firm i in industry j at time t.13 Note that labor is not used in the production of the final good.
Perfect competition prevails in the final good sector. Profit maximization yields the following
demand for each intermediate good:
13As is known, it is possible to interpret this production function as the Dixit-Stiglitz love-of-variety utility function,
implying that consumers directly consume xij(t) units of variety i produced in industry j.
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xij (t) =
pij (t)
  ✓1 ✓Z 1
0
Z nj(t)
0
pi0j0 (t)
  ✓1 ✓ di0dj0
· E (t)
pij (t)
(5)
where pij (t) denotes the price of the intermediate good i in industry j and E (t) is consumption
expenditure.14 Facing this demand function, each intermediate good firm produces a diﬀerentiated
product with labor under the patented technology developed in the R&D sector. If each labor unit
produces one unit of intermediate-good output, the standard mark-up rule yields pij = p = 1/✓.15
Substituting this price simplifies the above demand function to:
xij (t) ⌘ x (t) = E (t)
N (t) p (t)
8 i, j, (6)
where
N (t) ⌘
Z 1
0
nj (t) dj (7)
is the total number of varieties available at time t. Substituting these results into (4), we can write
Y (t) = x (t)N (t)
1 ✓
✓
Given x, the growth rate is given by
Y˙ (t)
Y (t)
=
1  ✓
✓
g (t) where g (t) =
N˙ (t)
N (t)
. (8)
This shows that economic growth is driven by increasing varieties.
To link the R&D sector to the growth process, we assume the following. (i) In each sector j, the
completion of one round of two-stage R&D is immediately followed by a new round of R&D compe-
tition with two new R&D firms. This sequence continues infinitely in time.16 (ii) The completion
of each round of R&D competition in industry j generates  N new varieties in that industry. This
assumption (0 <   < 1) captures positive externality in R&D in a simple and convenient way in the
present framework. We show shortly that, with identical Poisson rates ↵ and   in all industries,
14A more precise definition of E (t) will be given in Section 4.
15Here, the wage is set equal to one in anticipation of the general-equilibrium model of Section 4, in which it serves
as the numeraire.
16We can introduce an entry cost to be incurred at the beginning of a two-stage patent race. It is assumed to be
zero, because the entry cost does not aﬀect our key results.
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growth depends crucially on the number of industries in which A is patented.
Before proceeding further, we substitute (6) to express the flow profit for each intermediate good
as:
⇡ (t) = (1  ✓) E (t)
N (t)
. (9)
Since one round of a two-stage patent race generates  N (t) number of new varieties, a total flow
profit in an intermediate-goods industry j equals  N (t)⇡ (t). With permanent patents, the total
prize of a patent race is equivalent to the discounted sum of  N (t)⇡ (t) over an infinite time horizon.
Let this sum be denoted by ⇧. In the remainder of this section we take ⇧ as given. In Section 4 we
determine its value endogenously in general equilibrium.17
3.2 Steady State
The analysis of this subsection applies equally to first-to-file and first-to-invent. Since innovations
occur stochastically, a given industry j is randomly “located” at one of the numbered nodes in Figure
1. For example, in industry j 2 [J, 1], J = JF , JI , where the leader always patents A, firms are
either in stage 1 or 2. Thus, the patenting industry randomly changes its location between nodes 0
and 1.
Let AA and BB denote the state in which both firms are in stage 1 and stage 2, respectively,
and let ZPAA and ZPBB be the number of patenting industries in states AA and BB. Since there are
1  J patenting industries in the economy, we have18
ZPAA + Z
P
BB = 1  J, J = JF , JI . (10)
Industries in state AA discover A with the combined hazard rate of 2↵ and move to state BB.
That is, 2↵ZPAA industries move from state AA to state BB, as described in Figure 3(a). Similarly,
2 ZPBB industries move from BB to AA, as one round of R&D is completed and a fresh round starts.
In steady state, ZPAA and ZPBB must be constant, i.e.,
2 ZPBB = 2↵Z
P
AA.
17Since  N (t)⇡ (t) = (1  ✓)E (t), fixing ⇧ is equivalent to fixing consumption expenditure E (t).
18The subscripts F and I are dropped from Z’s unless ambiguity arises.
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This and (10) can be used to calculate the steady-state values of industry shares:
ZPAA
1  J =
 
↵+  
,
ZPBB
1  J =
↵
↵+  
, J = JF,JI . (11)
Turn next to the non-patenting industries j 2 [0, J), J = JF , JI . Such industries can be in
three states: AA, BB, and AB, the last of which indicates the asymmetric race in which the leader
is in stage 2 and the follower is in stage 1. Thus, non-patenting industries randomly change their
locations among three nodes: 0, 2 and 3 in first-to-file and 0, 2 and 4 in first-to-invent. Let ZNAA,
ZNBB and ZNAB denote the number of industries in each state. To calculate these values, note that
there are J non-patenting industries in the economy, and hence
J = ZNAA + Z
N
BB + Z
N
AB, J = JF,JI . (12)
Further, industries in AB move to BB with rate ↵ and to AA with rate  , as shown in Figure 3(b).
The number of industries in each state is constant in steady state, implying
2↵ZNAA = 2 Z
N
BB +  Z
N
AB,
2 ZNBB = ↵Z
N
AB.
The above three equations yield
ZNAA
J
=
(↵+  ) 
↵  + (↵+  )2
,
ZNBB
J
=
↵2
↵  + (↵+  )2
,
ZNAB
J
=
2↵ 
↵  + (↵+  )2
, (13)
where J = JF , JI . Note that
zPk ⌘
ZPk
1  J , k = AA,BB
zNk ⌘
ZNk
J
, k = AA,BB,AB
9>=>; J = JF , JI (14)
can be interpreted as the conditional probability that a given industry is in one of the possible
states. This interpretation is valid, irrespective of the patent-issuing rule in eﬀect. For example,
(11) implies that a patenting industry is in state AA with probability zPAA =  / (↵+  ).
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3.3 Rate of Technical Progress
Recall that each round of R&D competition in industry j creates  N varieties of intermediate goods
in that industry. This occurs every time one round of R&D competition is completed and an industry
returns to state AA. In a patenting industry, this occurs with Poisson rate 2  as shown in Figure
3(a). In a non-patenting industry, state AA is reached either from state BB or from state AB as in
Figure 3(b). The former case occurs with Poisson rate 2 , and the latter with Poisson rate  . These
observations imply that the total number of intermediate products N(t), defined in (7), increases
according to
N˙ (t) =  N
 
2 ZNBB +  Z
N
AB
 
+  N2 ZPBB. (15)
Then, (11), (13) and (15) can be used to calculate the rate of technical progress
N˙ (t)
N (t)
⌘ g = 2  ↵ 
↵+  
✓
1  ↵ 
↵  + (↵+  )2
J
◆
, J = JF , JI . (TP )
This equation shows that an increase in J slows economic growth. This has an intuitive expla-
nation. A higher J implies more non-patenting industries. In non-patenting industries, inventing
new blueprints takes a longer time on average because the follower has to “reinvent the wheel” (i.e.,
innovate A) in more industries. Thus, as J increases, the R&D sector invents fewer new varieties
per unit of time, and consequently the economy grows more slowly.
3.4 Equilibrium
In the present partial-equilibrium model, endogenous variables are J 2 {JF , JI} and g. In the first-
to-file system, (JF , gF ) are determined by (TH0F ) and (TP ). In the first-to-invent system, (JI , gI)
are defined by (TH0I ) and (TP ). In either case, the model can be solved recursively. (TH0F ) and
(TH0I ) first determine JF and JI , respectively and then (TP ) maps them to gF and gI . This, by
Proposition 1, leads to
Proposition 2. For given ⇧, gF > gI ; growth rate g is higher in first-to-file than in first-to-invent.
The proposition confirms that the Scotchmer-Green result can be extended into a growth context
in our basic model, where ⇧ is exogenous. The reason for the result lies in the risk-elimination eﬀect
of patenting (identified in Section 2.3), which is present in first-to-file but not in first-to-invent. The
next section will demonstrate that the prize eﬀect in Lemma 6, which emerges in general equilibrium
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settings, works against the risk-elimination eﬀect, so that the result in Proposition 2 can be reversed.
4 General Equilibrium
In this section, we extend the preceding partial-equilibrium model to general-equilibrium settings.
We do so by introducing consumers’ utility maximization and the labor market, which endogenizes
the prize of a patent race ⇧. We focus on steady state as before.
4.1 Consumers and Profits
We begin with consumers’ decision-making. Assume that there are L identical consumers. Each con-
sumer supplies a single unit of labor inelastically and has preferences over the final good represented
by the utility function
U =
Z 1
0
e ⇢t lnC(t)dt.
Note that ⇢ now denotes the representative consumer’s rate of time preference. In equilibrium,
demand C (t) for the final good equals its supply Y (t). The intertemporal optimization results in
the Euler condition:
E˙ (t)
E (t)
= r (t)  ⇢ (16)
where E(t) is the total expenditure and r(t) is the instantaneous rate of interest at time t.
In Section 3, we showed that profit per variety ⇡ (t) is given by (9), and that a total flow profit
 N (t)⇡ (t) is generated from each round of two-stage R&D competition. We now define the prize
of a patent race ⇧ as the discounted sum of such flow profits over an infinite time horizon;
⇧ (t) =
Z 1
t
e 
R ⌧
t r(s)ds N (⌧)⇡ (⌧) d⌧ =
  (1  ✓)
⇢
E (t) . (17)
The second equality in (17) makes use of (16) with E˙ (t) = 0. Using (17), we can rewrite the
threshold conditions (TH0F ) and (TH0I ) as
cB (JF ) = [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]   (1  ✓)
⇢
E, (THF )
cB (JI) = [(1   )     ⇢]   (1  ✓)
⇢
E. (THI)
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4.2 The Values of R&D Firms
In describing the R&D sector in Section 2, we deliberately ignored the term capturing capital
gains/losses in the asset equations of R&D firms. It was an innocuous shortcut to ease the exposition
of the model. In this section, we explicitly take into account the fact that the value of R&D firms
changes as the economy grows.
First, let us consider the leader in a patenting industry j under the first-to-file system. Its value,
defined in (1) in the partial equilibrium model, is now given by
r (t)V PF (t) =  cB(j) +B(⇧ (t)  V PF (t)) +B( ⇧ (t)  V PF (t)) + V˙ PF (t) (18)
where the last term represents a capital gain/loss. Note that we have E˙t = V˙ PF = 0 in steady state,
given that wage is the numeraire. Using (16), therefore, (18) is reduced to (1). By the same logic,
one can show that the value functions used in the partial equilibrium model are all valid for this
extended model. Using (17), we can now rewrite the threshold conditions (TH0F ) and (TH0I ) as
cB (JF ) = [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]   (1  ✓)
⇢
E, (THF )
cB (JI) = [(1   )     ⇢]   (1  ✓)
⇢
E. (THI)
4.3 Labor Market
To close the model, we introduce the labor market. In equilibrium, the total supply of labor L is
allocated between the R&D sector (LR) and the intermediate goods sector (LM ). Since each unit
of labor produces one unit of an intermediate good, the total demand for labor in the intermediate-
goods sector is given by
LM (t) =
Z 1
0
Z n(j)
0
xij (t) didj = ✓E (t) ,
where the second equality follows from (5). Naturally, an increase in E raises labor demand in
manufacture.
To calculate the demand for labor in the R&D sector, recall that cA(j) and cB(j) denote the
number of workers employed in stage 1 and stage 2 in industry j, respectively. Let us first consider a
patenting industry j 2 [J, 1], J = JF , JI . We showed already that, in steady state, zPAA and zPBB are
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the probability that industry j is in states AA and BB, respectively. Therefore, the total number
of R&D workers in industry j is 2cA (j) zPAA + 2cB (j) zPBB. Making use of this, we can compute the
number of R&D workers in the patenting industries:
Z 1
J
 
2cA (j) z
P
AA + 2cB (j) z
P
BB
 
dj. (19)
An analogous procedure shows that there are 2cA (j) zNAA+2cB (j) zNBB +(cA (j) + cB (j)) zNAB R&D
workers in a non-patenting industry j 2 [0, J), J = JF , JI . The first two terms arise from symmetric
states AA and BB, while the third represents the labor demand in asymmetric state AB. Thus, the
total amount of R&D labor employed in non-patenting industries equals
Z J
0
⇥
2cA (j) z
N
AA + 2cB (j) z
N
BB + (cA (j) + cB (j)) z
N
AB
⇤
dj. (20)
Combining (19) and (20), we can show, after much algebra, that the total number of workers in the
R&D sector, LR, equals
LR (t) =  ¯+   (J) , J = JF , JI
where
 ¯ ⌘ 2
↵+  
✓
 
Z 1
0
cA (j) dj + ↵
Z 1
0
cB (j) dj
◆
> 0
  (J) ⌘ 2↵
2 ⇣
↵  + (↵+  )2
⌘
(↵+  )
Z J
0
[cA (j)  cB (j)] dj.
Note that  ¯ is independent of J but that   (J) depends on J , leading to
Lemma 7. In general equilibrium, an increase in J (= JF , JI) decreases demand for R&D labor if
and only if cA (j) < cB (j).
To understand Lemma 7 intuitively, consider the following ratios constructed from (11) and (13):
zPBB
zPAA
=
↵
 
zNBB + z
N
AB/2
zNAA + z
N
AB/2
=
↵
 
· ↵+  
2↵+  
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These ratios indicate the relative probabilities that a firm is in stage 2 of R&D competition (relative
to stage 1) in a patenting and a non-patenting industry, respectively. Computation shows that the
former ratio exceeds the latter, meaning that a patenting industry is more likely to be in stage 2
than a non-patenting industry. Thus, if cA (j) < cB (j), a patenting industry employs more labor
for R&D on average than a non-patenting industry, and hence an increase in J (which increases the
number of non-patenting industries) reduces demand for R&D labor.
The labor market clears if L = LM + LR, that is,
L = ✓E +  ¯+   (J) , J = JF , JI . (LM)
(LM) shows that the relationship between consumer expenditure and the demand for R&D labor
depends on how   (J) changes in J (see Lemma 7).
4.4 Steady State Equilibrium
The following result defines a steady state equilibrium of the general equilibrium model.
Proposition 3. In steady state, the equilibrium growth rate in the first-to-file system is determined
by (THF ), (TP) and (LM), and it is derived from (THI), (TP) and (LM) for the first-to-invent
rule.
These are the key functions in our analysis. First, (17) maps E positively to ⇧. Then, (THF ) and
(THI) relate ⇧ positively to J by Lemma 5. Finally, (TP ) relates J (= JF , JI) negatively to g. The
reason for the negative relationship between J (= JF , JI) and g is familiar by now; non-patenting
industries take longer times to complete each round of R&D, and hence an increase in the share of
non-patenting industries in the economy (an increase in J) slows economic growth. Therefore, these
functions together imply that an increase in E is negatively related to economic growth.19
Since labor market-clearing requires that E and J satisfy condition (LM), the (LM) function
and the (THk) functions (k = F, I) jointly determine the equilibrium J (= JF , JI) and E. The
(THk) functions defines a positive relationship between E and J , while the relationship defined by
the (LM) function can be positive or negative. As we will see shortly, how the (LM) function relates
E to J holds the key to understanding the nature of steady state equilibrium.
19(17) shows that ⇧ (hence profit) is a positively linear function of expenditure E, meaning that profit and growth
are negatively related. This is consistent with the result of Aghion, et al. (2005) that there is an inverted U relationship
between competition and growth, implying that higher profit can discourage growth.
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4.4.1 Unique Interior Equilibrium
In this subsection we consider three cases in which there is a unique interior equilibrium. Multiple
interior equilibria are discussed in the following subsection.
Lemma 7 implies that interindustry R&D cost diﬀerences are crucial in understanding the nature
of steady state equilibrium. Let us begin with the case of cA (j) = cB (j) for all j 2 [0, 1]. This special
case is depicted in Figure 4. The discussion above implies that the (LM) function is independent of
J , so it is represented by the vertical line in Figure 4. Therefore, the (LM) equation alone determines
the equilibrium E uniquely. From the preceding discussion, the (THF ) and (THI) curves are both
upward sloping as shown in the figure. The intersections of these functions with the (LM) curve
determine the equilibrium JI and JF . Now, Proposition 1 states that JI > JF for a given ⇧ and
hence E, implying that the (THF ) curve lies above the (THI) curve, as in Figure 4. Thus, JI > JF
implies that gI < gF in steady state equilibrium. The vertical (LM) function in Figure 4 implies that
patent law changes generate no general equilibrium eﬀect. Therefore, the present case is essentially
equivalent to the partial equilibrium model of Section 3. Note that this result is driven solely by the
risk-elimination eﬀect of patenting, identified in Section 2.3. The prize eﬀect identified in Lemma 6
is absent because E (hence ⇧) is the same for both patenting systems. A reversal of the Scotchmer-
Green result is possible only when the risk-elimination eﬀect is outweighed by the prize eﬀect, which
emerges only for cA (j) 6= cB (j).
Turning to general cases of unequal R&D costs across industries, we distinguish the following
three cases:
Case (i) cA (j)   cB (j), i.e.  0 (J)   0 for j 2 [0, 1] and
cB (0)
 F
<
L   ¯    (0)
✓
,
cB (1)
 I
>
L   ¯    (1)
✓
(21)
Case (ii) cA (j) < cB (j), i.e.  0 (J) < 0 for j 2 [0, 1] and (21)
Case (iii) cA (j) < cB (j), i.e.  0 (J) < 0 for j 2 [0, 1] and
cB (0)
 F
>
L   ¯    (0)
✓
,
cB (1)
 I
<
L   ¯    (1)
✓
(22)
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where
 F ⌘ [(1   )      (⇢+ 2↵)]   (1  ✓)
⇢
,  I ⌘ [(1   )     ⇢]   (1  ✓)
⇢
.
By Lemma 7, the (LM) curve is downward-sloping (or vertical) in (E, J) space in Case (i) and
upward-sloping in Cases (ii) and (iii).
Let us consider each case in turn. Figure 5 illustrates Case (i), where cA (j) > cB (j). 20 (The
special case, with cA (j) = cB (j), was already examined above.) By Lemma 7, the (LM) curve is
downward-sloping.21 Figure 5 indicates that JF < JI . Then, the growth equation (TP ) implies
gF > gI ; first-to-file promotes faster economic growth.22 This is qualitatively the same result as in
the partial equilibrium case. To develop the intuition which will turn out useful later, note that the
E, and hence ⇧, is higher in first-to-file than in first-to-invent, which by Lemma 6 implies that the
prize eﬀect makes patenting less attractive in first-to-file than in first-to-invent. However, in the
present case, the prize eﬀect is dominated by the risk-elimination eﬀect that works against patenting
in determining JF and JI , as shown in Figure 5.
We turn to Cases (ii) and (iii), where cA (j) < cB (j). In Lemma 7, we showed that for cA (j) <
cB (j) the (LM) curve slopes upward, implying a positive relationship between E and J . This
relation arises because an increase in J reduces labor demand in R&D, thereby shifting labor to the
production sector and raising E and hence prize ⇧. In general, as cB (j) increases relative to cA (j),
a rise in J brings about a larger increase in E, flattening the (LM) curve. As we will see shortly,
this result can amplify the prize eﬀect, possibly reversing the Scotchmer-Green result.
Let us first consider Case (ii). In this case, the diﬀerence between cB (j) and cA (j) is relatively
small, so that (LM) cuts the the threshold conditions (THF ) and (THI) “from below,” as shown in
Figure 6. As a consequence, JF < JI , and hence gF > gI , which is qualitatively equivalent to Case
(i).23 Intuitively, Figure 6 shows that E (hence ⇧) is lower in first-to-file than in first-to-invent,
implying that patenting is a more attractive option in first-to-file. In this sense, the prize eﬀect
reinforces the risk-elimination eﬀect of patenting so that gF is even greater relative to gI compared
with Case (i). However, this result dramatically changes in Case (iii), to which we turn next.
20In Figure 5, each side of the two inequality conditions in (21) defines the “corner values” of the (THF ), (THI)
and (LM) curves at J = 0 and J = 1.
21This curve starts from a point to the right of the (THF ) curve on the horizontal axis and ends at a point to the
left of the (THI) curve for J = 1.
22(21) guarantees the existence of a unique interior equilibrium.
23The inequality conditions in (21) ensure the existence of an interior equilibrium.
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Figure 7 illustrates the case, where the (LM) curve intersects the (THk) curves (k = F, I) “from
above” unlike in Cases (i)-(ii). This arises if the diﬀerence between cB (j) and cA (j) is suﬃciently
large. It is clear from the figure that JF > JI and hence gF < gI ; first-to-invent promotes faster
economic growth than first-to-file, a result that contrasts sharply with the Scotchmer-Green result
and those from the previous cases. This reversal can be explained intuitively as follows. In the
present case, E (hence ⇧) is smaller in first-to-invent than in first-to-file in equilibrium. That is,
the prize eﬀect, which is endogenously determined through the labor market, is so large that it
dominates the risk-elimination eﬀect, inducing A to be patented in a greater number of industries
in first-to-invent, thereby leading to a higher growth rate comapred with first-to-file.
Unlike Cases (i) and (ii), Case (iii) can have, in addition to the interior equilibrium, the corner
solutions at 8>><>>:
E0 =
L   ¯    (0)
✓
JF = JI = 0
8>><>>:
E1 =
L   ¯    (1)
✓
JF = JI = 1
where E0 and E1 are consumption expenditure when J = 0 and J = 1, respectively, for J = JF , JI .
Figure 8 is instrumental in explaining this result. To ease exposition, only the (THI) line (for the
first-to-invent system) is drawn for three diﬀerent values of ⇧ =
  (1  ✓)
⇢
E in (17). The middle
curve defines the threshold industry JI , which corresponds to the interior equilibrium in Figure 7.
The upper line, on the other hand, characterizes a corner solution C in Figure 8, which corresponds
to E0 =
L   ¯    (0)
✓
in Figure 7. For the existence of this equilibrium, the following condition
must hold:
cB (0)
 F
  E0 = L   ¯    (0)
✓
. (23)
The left inequality comes from the fact that (2) is positive at C, and the right equality is due to
the labour market condition (LM). Similarly, a corner equilibrium D in Figure 8 corresponds to
E1 =
L   ¯    (1)
✓
in Figure 7, and requires
cB (1)
 F
 E1 = L   ¯    (1)
✓
. (24)
The same reasoning applies to the first-to-file case, yielding similar conditions as above. Importantly,
the conditions (23) and (24) and similar conditions for the first-to-file system are all consistent with
(22). That is, a unique interior equilibrium coexists with those corner solutions.
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The next proposition summarizes what we found so far in this section:
Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium such that JF > JI and gF < gI for cA (j) < cB (j).
4.4.2 Multiple Interior Equilibria
In the preceding section, we focused on cases of unique interior equilibrium. In Case (i), there is no
other equilibria since the (LM) curve is negatively sloped and hence can cross the (THk) curves,
k = F, I only once. However, in Cases (ii) and (iii), there can be multiple equilibria because the
(LM) and (THk) curves, k = F, I, are both positively sloped. In this subsection we examine such
possibilities.24
In general, Case (ii) admits odd numbers of interior equilibria. Figure 9 shows three equilibria
in each patent system. Let us label the three pairs of equilibrium borderline industries by
 
J1F , J
1
I
 
, 
J2F , J
2
I
 
and
 
J3F , J
3
I
 
. Note that at
 
J2F , J
2
I
 
and
 
J3F , J
3
I
 
, the (LM) curve cuts the (THk) curves
(k = F, I) “from below”, whereas at
 
J1F , J
1
I
 
the (LM) curve cuts the (THk) curves (k = F, I) “from
above”. In the latter case, we have J1F > J1I and hence g1F < g1I , which reverses the Scotchmer-Green
result. The same reasoning can be applied to the case of m equilibria (m = 3, 5, 7, 9...).
In Case (iii), by contrast, interior equilibria can occur in odd or even numbers. Figure 10 depicts
the case of three equilibria, with the Scotchmer-Green result reversed at
 
J2F , J
2
I
 
and
 
J3F , J
3
I
 
where
the (LM) curve cuts the (THk) curves (k = F, I) “from above”. When there are even numbers of
interior equilibria, there can be two types. The first type arises if the following conditions hold:
cB (0)
 F
<
L   ¯    (0)
✓
,
cB (1)
 F
<
L   ¯    (1)
✓
. (25)
Figure 11 shows the case of two interior equilibria, where the above conditions are met. It is clear
from the figure that the the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed at
 
J1F , J
1
I
 
, where the (LM) curve
cuts the (THk) curves (k = F, I) “from above”. We have the second type if the following inequalities
hold:
cB (0)
 I
>
L   ¯    (0)
✓
,
cB (1)
 I
>
L   ¯    (1)
✓
. (26)
Figure 12 illustrates the case with two interior equilibria, where the above inequalities are satisfied.
Again, the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed at
 
J2F , J
2
I
 
, where the (LM) curve cuts the (THk)
24We focus on  0 (J) > 0 and do not consider the case where the sign of  0 (J) changes, i.e.  0 (J) T 0, because the
latter sheds little new light on the issue at hand, though it is more general.
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curves (k = F, I) “from above.” The case of m equilibria where m = 2, 3, 4, 6, ... can be analyzed
similarly.
We have established the following result:
Proposition 5. If there is a multiplicity of interior equilibria, there is at least one interior equilib-
rium in which the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed .
4.5 Discussion: How “Plausible” Is It?
We have seen that in cases of multiple equilibria the the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed at least
in one interior equilibrium. But how “plausible” is it? We now address this question. Since reversals
occur in the presence of multiple equilibria, one possible way to reduce the number of equilibria is
to appeal to stability analysis. However, it is not particularly useful in the present analysis since
we focus on steady state throughout. Instead, we examine whether our model is consistent with
the standard growth models and empirical works in terms of the predictions they make. For this
purpose, we focus on the rate of subjective time preference ⇢. There are two reasons for the selection
of this criterion. Firstly, the eﬀect of ⇢ is widely known in growth models. Secondly, reversals occur
only in the general equilibrium model, where consumer spending plays an important role.
Intuitively, a greater degree of patience is good for growth. Growth is driven by accumulation of
physical and human capital and technical progress, all of which require investment in one form or
another. And patience is an important determinant of deferred consumption and hence investment,
aﬀecting income levels and growth. Indeed, this intuition is consistent with the standard models of
economic growth. According to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, income levels are higher with
a lower rate of time preference. In the endogenous growth literature, both the AK model and the
Lucas model of human capital accumulation imply faster growth when consumers are more patient.
The standard R&D-based models of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991) on which the current model is based, as well as a myriad of other growth models
yield similar predictions.
Turning to empirical evidence, Dohmen, et. al. (2016) directly tackle the issue of how patience
aﬀects income/growth. Using a dataset of 8,000 individuals from 76 countries, they find that patience
alone explains about 40% of income variations across samples in a univariate regression. Their study
also reports a strong correlation between patience and economic growth in the medium-run growth
after World War II as well as over the past 200 years. Hübner and Vannoorenberghe (2015) conduct
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a similar analysis. Using a panel of 89 countries, they find a sizable impact of patience on income
per worker, total factor productivity, and capital stock in 2000. In a diﬀerent approach, Galor and
Özak (2016) argue that growth-conducive environments lead to a greater degree of patience. On an
individual level, Mischel et al. (1992) report that patient children are more likely to take formal
education and acquire higher incomes in their later life. From a historical perspective, Clark (2007)
argue that patience drives economic development. All these studies indicate that growth is higher
with a lower value of the rate of time preference ⇢.
We now examine whether our model yields a prediction which are consistent with our intuition,
the standard growth models and the empirical evidence above. In our model, changes in ⇢ aﬀect the
threshold conditions (THF ) and (THI) only. In particular, a fall in ⇢ (a greater degree of patience)
causes the (THk) curve, k = F, I, to shift up. With this result on hand, consider first the unique
interior equilibrium cases. In Cases (i) and (ii) in Figures 4-6, the upward shifting (THF ) and (THI)
curves cause JF and JI to rise, implying slower economic growth. This is contrary to the evidence
discussed above. In Figures 7, on the other hand, a lower ⇢ causes JF and JI to fall, leading to
faster economic growth. This is consistent with the predictions of the standard growth models, the
evidence, and our intuition regarding the eﬀect of a greater degree of patience. Thus, an equilibrium
is consistent with theory and evidence only where the (LM) curve cuts the (THF ) and (THI) curves
“from above”, that is, the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed.
It is easily confirmed that the above conclusion holds when there are multiple interior equilibria,
as in Figures 9-12. That is, only when the (LM) curve intersects the (THF ) and (THI) curves “from
above”, the equilibrium is consistent with empirical evidence and the predictions from the standard
growth models, and in such equilibriums the Scotchmer-Green result is reversed.
5 Conclusion
In the paper, we present an R&D-based model of economic growth, where discoveries of blueprints
for intermediate goods take two innovations, and where innovators strategically decide whether or
not to patent their innovations in the spirit of Scotchmer and Green (1990). We assume asymmetric
R&D costs across intermediate industries and explore how incentives to patent innovations are de-
termined by the choice between two patent-issuing rules: first-to-file and first-to-invent. In addition
to presenting a growth model with these new features, our focus is on the question of which rule is
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more conducive to product development and economic growth. Our conclusion is that first-to-invent
promotes faster growth than first-to-file. Thus, if our analysis is correct, we are in a “wrong” patent
regime.
To save space we present the analysis based on inter-industry R&D cost diﬀerences. However,
our result is robust if industries are diﬀerentiated with respect to the distributive shares of the prize
between innovators of first-stage and second stage innovations (see footnote 5). Admittedly, other
assumptions can potentially influence the conclusion of our model. Thus it is important to point
out two obvious limitations of our model.
First, to follow the Scotchmer-Green framework, we assume that the arrival rates of intermediate
and final innovations are fixed. This assumption is made to extend their analysis to a growth
context and also useful in simplifying the general-equilibrium model. However, it comes at a cost.
Suppose an economy switches from first-to-invent to first-to-file. Its total impact can be decomposed
into two component eﬀects: (1) the eﬀect on growth realized for given arrival rates, and (2) the
remaining eﬀect on growth through changes in arrival rates. The present analysis captures (1) only.
A future work should try to endogenize arrival rates,. Such work will also verify whether the result
of Miyagiwa and Ohno (2015) mentioned in the Introduction holds in a growth context. Second,
there is no free entry into the R&D sector in our model. This may be justifiable due to fixed
entry cost. However, allowing free entry is a natural extension of the model. However, with free
entry, the underlying mechanism that operates through consumer spending and the labor market
and partitions of industries into patenting and non-patenting nonetheless remains intact and hence
we conjecture that free entry is unlikely to alter our conclusion. Finally, the robustness of our result
should be checked in alternative models of growth, for example, those based on quality improvement.
We leave these extensions for future research.
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Figure 1: The leader decides on whether or not to patent the intermediate innovation at node DL,
and the follower decides on patenting at node DF . ↵L and  L mean that the leader succeeds in the
intermediate and final innovations, respectively. Similarly, ↵F and  F are for the follower. Firms
conduct R&D at nodes 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4.
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Figure 2: Determination of the threshold industries.
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Figure 3: Transition of industries.
F15.pdf
Figure 4: Partial equilibrium in Section 3 is essentially equivalent to a general equilibrium model
with cA (j) = cB (j) for all j.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium in Case (i).
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Figure 6: Equilibrium in Case (ii).
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Figure 7: Equilibrium in Case (iii).
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Figure 8: A unique interior equilibrium coexists with two corner solutions in Case (iii).
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Figure 9: The reversal of the Scotchmer-Green result occurs at
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Figure 10: The reversal of the Scotchmer-Green result occurs at
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Figure 11: The reversal of the Scotchmer-Green result occurs at
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Figure 12: The reversal of the Scotchmer-Green result occurs at
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